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s has been pointed out elsewhere, immigrants are particularly likely to gamble, either for cultural reasons or
because of the stress caused by trying
to assimilate.1 Under the immigration
laws of the United States, however, non-citizens who
engage in illegal gambling activities can be denied admission into the country; can be deported; can have
their applications for citizenship rejected; and can be
denaturalized (i.e., stripped of their U.S. citizenship).2
More than one client has gotten into trouble because his
or her lawyer did not know about these provisions.3
To be fair, however, almost nothing has been written

A

A non-citizen ordinarily is deported after serving his or her sentence. If supervised
release (i.e., parole) is made part of the sentence, “the court may provide, as a
condition of supervised release, that [the defendant] be deported and remain outside
the United States, and may order that [he or she] be delivered to a duly authorized
immigration ofﬁcial for such deportation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For examples of
such orders, see United States v. Hagay, 2017 WL 5569796, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
(under { 5 of “Special Conditions of Supervision”); United States v. Ibarra-Luna,
2009 WL 1181214, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 2009). See also United States v. Seng Chen
Yong, 2017 WL 44944, at *2 (D. Nev. 2017) (approving plea deal under which
defendant agreed to plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact to an unlawful
sports betting operation and further agreed to “a sentence of ﬁve years of unsupervised
probation[,] a ﬁne of $100,000[, and to] depart the country immediately and not return
for ﬁve years.”) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 926 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2019).
At one time, federal judges imposing a criminal sentence could ask immigration
ofﬁcials to forego deportation. This option no longer exists. See United States v.
Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 697 (2d Cir. 1992).

N
Y
O
I
L
T
N
U
O
B
I
W ISTR
E
I
V
D ON
E
R
R
R
I
O
T
F
O
C
F
D
U
E
D
D
O
N
R
E
P
T
E
N
I
R
T
R
O
NO

DOI: 10.1089/glr2.2020.0027 © Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
1

I. INTRODUCTION

See, e.g., Erica Marshall and Debi LaPlante, Disordered Gambling, in ENHEALTH 565 (San Loue and Martha Sajatovic eds. 2012);
Serena M. King et al., Gambling, Substance Use, and Help-Seeking Attitudes in a
Community-Based Sample of Lao Refugees, Immigrants, and U.S.-Born Citizens,
51 PROF’L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 51 (2020); Mary Keovisai and Wooksoo Kim,
“It’s Not Ofﬁcially Gambling”: Gambling Perceptions and Behaviors Among
Older Chinese Immigrants, 35 J. GAMBLING STUD. 1317 (2019); Natale Canale et al.,
A Large-Scale National Study of Gambling Severity Among Immigrant and NonImmigrant Adolescents: The Role of the Family, 66 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 125
(2017); Alyssa N. Wilson et al., Gambling Prevalence Rates Among Immigrants: A
Multigenerational Examination, 42 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 79 (2015); Grant N.
Marshall et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Lifetime Disordered Gambling in
Cambodian Refugees Residing in Long Beach, CA, 11 J. IMMIGR. & MINORITY
HEALTH 35 (2009); Sandra L. Momper et al., The Prevalence and Types of Gambling Among Undocumented Mexican Immigrants in New York City, 25 J. GAMBLING STUD. 49 (2009); Nancy M. Petry et al., Gambling Participation and
Problems Among South East Asian Refugees to the United States, 54 PSYCHIATRIC
SVCS. 1142 (2003); Tamika Harvey and Nyamal Tutdeal, The Inﬂuence of Gambling on the Immigrant and Refugee Community, 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON GAMBLING & RISK TAKING, May 29, 2019, at https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/
gaming_institute/2019/May29/2/.
CYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIGRANT
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These consequences, of course, are in addition to any criminal sentence that may
be imposed for the underlying gambling offense:

On July 22, 2008, Abid Ghani pled guilty to a single-count tenth superseding
information. The information charged that between November 2006 and
February 2007, the defendant, together with another, having knowledge of
the commission of a felony involving the operation of an illegal gambling
business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, concealed and did not make
known the illegal business. . . .
Ghani was sentenced on November 25, 2008. . . . Ghani is a citizen of
Pakistan; at the sentencing hearing he waived his right to have his consulate
informed of the charges against him and indicated an understanding of the
potential immigration consequences of this conviction. . . .

United States v. Ghani, 2008 WL 5459184, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). See also Chai v.
Att’y Gen. U.S., 440 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (“While she was living in the
United States, Chai developed a gambling addiction. To facilitate this addiction, she
engaged in illegal behavior. On March 10, 2006, Chai pleaded guilty to, and was
convicted of, one count of theft by deception and one count of theft by unlawful
taking. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count, the terms to
run concurrently. On June 20, 2006, Chai was charged with removability under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, and under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.”); Shah v. Wolf,
2020 WL 4456530, at *1 (N.D. Tex.), report and recommendation adopted, 2020
WL 4437484 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (Pakistani citizen ordered deported after being
convicted of various crimes, including “possession of a gambling device in violation of [Texas Penal Code] 47.06[.]”).

3
In Alam v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 647 (W.D.N.C. 2009), for example, a
lawyer allowed his Pakistani client to plead guilty to operating an illegal gambling
business. When the client later discovered that this plea meant that he could be
deported, he moved to have his conviction and sentence vacated. In granting his
request, the court wrote:

Counsel’s advice regarding the immigration consequences of petitioner’s
plea was undeniably grossly inaccurate, given that the governing statute—§
1101(a)(43)(J)—explicitly enumerates a § 1955 conviction as an “aggravated felony” requiring removal. Accordingly, Counsel’s advice that a §
1955 violation is not an “aggravated felony” requiring petitioner’s removal
clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; indeed, the plain
language of the applicable immigration statutes compels the conclusion that
Counsel grossly misinformed petitioner on this subject. . . .
[P]etitioner has also demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result of
Counsel’s errors. More speciﬁcally, petitioner’s afﬁdavit avers—credibly—
that he would not have pled guilty absent Counsel’s assurances that a § 1955
conviction would not lead to petitioner’s removal. Nor is there any reason to
doubt this averment, as the record reﬂects (i) that petitioner has resided in the
United States for more than twenty-ﬁve years; (ii) that petitioner’s wife is a
permanent legal resident; (iii) that petitioner’s children are native-born U.S.
citizens; and (iv) that petitioner has built a successful business in the United
States distinct from any illegal gambling. These circumstances make it clear
that petitioner would not want to return to Pakistan, a currently unstable
country with which he apparently has few ties. And it follows a fortiori that if
petitioner would not have pled absent Counsel’s erroneous pre-plea advice,
petitioner similarly would have sought to withdraw his plea in the absence of
Counsel’s erroneous assurances that Counsel could convince the government to halt removal after sentencing. Thus, petitioner has demonstrated a
reasonable probability that, but for Counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
assistance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. Accordingly, the petition must be granted and petitioner’s conviction
and sentence vacated.

Id. at 652–54 (footnotes omitted). For another such case, see United States v. Sun
Hwang, 658 F. App’x 874 (9th Cir. 2016) (criminal lawyer who obtained opinions
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about them.4 Accordingly, this article provides a muchneeded primer.5 Before proceeding, one important point
should be made. Contrary to popular belief, nothing pre-

vents an undocumented immigrant from claiming a
gaming prize. Doing so, however, may bring the player
to the attention of the immigration authorities.

from two different immigration lawyers, one stating that the client would be subject
to removal if she pled guilty to a gambling offense and the other taking the opposite
position, did not meet his constitutional obligations by simply giving the client both
opinions with no advice as to which one was correct).
In Matter of A-D-, 2017 WL 5714082 (A.A.O. 2017), however, the applicant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected:

(“[C]ertain gambling activities will temporarily preclude ﬁndings of good moral
character, even absent criminal charge or conviction.”); Maryellen Fullerton and
Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 425,
436 (1986) (“Sixth, regulatory violations are generally not crimes of moral turpitude. Gambling and immigration violations are examples of regulatory violations.”) (footnotes omitted); Patricia J. Freshwater, Note, The Obligation of NonRefoulement Under the Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture of Its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 585, 589
n.27 (2005) (“Whereas the term ‘aggravated felony’ may sound as if it includes
only the most serious violent crimes, under the deﬁnition provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, even theft offenses with a penalty of more than one
year in prison, illegal gambling, and fraud are generally considered aggravated
felonies.”).
The current gap is particularly evident when one examines Mary E. Kramer’s
otherwise excellent treatise IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A
GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS (8th ed. 2019). Kramer’s entire
discussion of the subject consists of the following sentence: “The abbreviated list
below contains the aggravated felony offenses under the INA, most of which are
discussed in greater detail throughout the chapter. . . . (J) Certain racketeering and
gambling offenses, where a term of imprisonment of at least one year may be
imposed[.]” Id. at 349–50.

The record reﬂects the following criminal history:
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 In 2005, the Applicant was convicted after pleading guilty to assault of a
family member, which is a class A misdemeanor under section 22.01 of
the Texas Penal Code. She was sentenced to six days in jail and a $100
ﬁne.
 In 2014, the Applicant was convicted after pleading guilty to possession
of gambling device, equipment, or paraphernalia, which is a class A
misdemeanor under section 47.06 of the Texas Penal Code. She was
sentenced to three days in jail. . . .
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The Applicant asserts there were mitigating circumstances underlying each
of her convictions . . . . First, she states that she pled guilty to the charges
based on her defense attorney’s advice that these were minor offenses that
would not affect her immigration status. . . .
Unfortunately, we are unable to exclude the Applicant’s convictions, as she
has not shown that the convictions have been vacated or overturned. Collateral attacks upon a conviction “do not operate to negate the ﬁnality of [the]
conviction unless and until the conviction is overturned.” Matter of Madrigal-Calvo, 21 I&N Dec. 323, 327 (BIA 1996).
The Applicant claims that she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel for
both charges, but she has not provided evidence that either conviction has
been vacated based on a defect in the proceedings. See Matter of Adamiak, 23
I. & N. Dec. 878, 881 (BIA 2006) (holding that a conviction vacated because
of a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, i.e., the failure of the court
to advise of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea, should
be recognized for immigration purposes.). . . .

Id. at *2.
The same result was reached in In re Applicant, 2013 WL 3903472 (A.A.O. 2013):
In response to notices dated October 20, 2011 and February 21, 2012, which
requested the applicant to submit certiﬁed judgment and conviction documents from the courts for all arrests, the applicant submitted court documentation in Case number 11-2011-CF-001001-CXXX-XX from the Circuit
Court, Twentieth Judicial Circuit, in and for Collier County, Florida. The
court documentation reﬂects that on May 5, 2011, the applicant was arrested
and charged with establish gambling place keep house for, resist ofﬁcer obstruct without violence and lottery - operating set up promote conduct for
money. On June 6, 2011, the charges were amended to indicate lotteryplaying possess ticket, a violation of Florida Status 849.09(1)(h), a ﬁrst
degree misdemeanor, and Florida Statute 849.09(1)(d);777.011, lottery - aid
setting up, promoting, or conducting for money, a third degree felony. On
January 5, 2012, the applicant pled no contest to violating Florida Statute
849.09(1)(d); 777.011. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and the applicant
was placed on probation for 18 months and ordered to pay court costs.
Counsel’s statements have been considered; however, no evidence has been
provided on appeal to support his assertion that the applicant had not been
advised of the possible immigration consequences of a plea by either his
counsel or the trial court. The assertion of counsel does not constitute evidence. Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983); Matter of
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez,
17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The AAO concludes that the felony
conviction continues to effect immigration consequences. Furthermore, the
adjudication of an appeal will not be held in abeyance while an applicant is
seeking post-conviction relief.

Id. at *2.
4

No previous work speciﬁcally focusing on the immigration consequences of
gambling crimes has been found. Instead, commentators simply have mentioned in
passing that non-citizens can get into trouble for illegal gambling. See, e.g., Susan
L. Pilcher, Assessing Collateral Immigration Consequences of Criminal Justice
Decisionmaking When the Defendant Is an Alien, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 279, 280 (1996)

5

Cases such as United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1075 (1977), are beyond the scope of this article. In Ong, the operators of
multiple illegal gambling houses were found guilty of trying to bribe local immigration ofﬁcers. For similar cases, see United States v. Cheng, 763 F. App’x 85
(2d Cir. 2019) (defendant sentenced to 68 months in prison for using extortion to
enforce gambling debts was not entitled to a credit for the six months he spent in
immigration custody); Qian Jin Lin v. Anderson, 2013 WL 3776249 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claim that immigration ofﬁcers
wrongly seized $5,600 from her during a raid of a suspected illegal betting parlor).
This article also omits the many cases in which an applicant has cited his or her
spouse’s gambling as part of an effort to obtain “battered alien” status. See, e.g., In
re Self-Petitioner, 2014 WL 5430939 (A.A.O. 2014). For a case in which an applicant instead sought to protect her spouse, see In re Application, 2007 WL
5338236 (A.A.O. 2007). Among other reasons, the applicant asked not to be sent
back to India because her husband, having worked in the U.S. gambling industry,
would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to get a job if he joined her:
Counsel asserts that, if [husband] is honest in regard to his employment
history with a casino, a signiﬁcant number of employers will not consider
him because gambling is illegal and considered taboo in India. However,
there is no evidence in the record that [husband] would suffer any consequences as a result of his employment in the U.S. gaming industry.

Id. at *6. For a case in which a woman ﬂed her homeland to avoid a forced marriage,
which had been arranged to pay off her mother’s gambling debts, see Ying Lin v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 319 F. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2009).
Although it is not an immigration case, Huerta-Orosco v. Cosgrove, 979 F. Supp.
2d 974 (N.D. Iowa 2013), is quite interesting. In it, the court granted the
plaintiff’s request for permission to ﬁle an amended complaint based on the
following facts:
Huerta–Orosco claims that on October 31, 2000, he was “a non-English
speaking undocumented illiterate Mexican National” and that he won the
sum of $1,019,000.19 while gambling on a riverboat. . . . He further contends he was concerned that he could not claim his winnings because of his
immigration status and that he would be turned in for deportation if he attempted to do so.
To resolve this dilemma, Huerta–Orosco allegedly sought the help of . . .
Pamela Rosales and Randy Verbeski. While the new complaint does not
describe Huerta–Orosco’s relationship with them, he alleges that they agreed
to help him claim the money and ultimately made the claim under Rosales’
name. He alleges that [the riverboat] paid Rosales an advance of about
$36,750, which she delivered to Huerta–Orosco.
Huerta–Orosco next alleges that at the direction of Rosales and Verbeski, he
retained “Joe Cosgrove, aka Francis ‘Joe’ Cosgrove, Frank Cosgrove and/or
the Cosgrove Law Firm” to recover the remainder of the winnings through
Rosales and Verbeski. He alleges that his immigration status and concerns
about deportation were explained to “Cosgrove” and that “Cosgrove” agreed
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
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The ﬁrst reported U.S. case to discuss the relationship between gambling and immigration appears to
be In re Ah Fong.6 In 1874, while riding circuit in
California, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen J.
Field opined:

occupation, ﬁne him, and, if he persists in it,
imprison him, and the evil will be remedied.7
The current immigration laws of the United States
appear in Title 8 of the United States Code.8 As
will be seen, they differ signiﬁcantly from the approach advocated by Justice Field.

Where the evil apprehended by the state from
the ingress of foreigners is that such foreigners
will disregard the laws of the state, and thus be
injurious to its peace, the remedy lies in the
more vigorous enforcement of the laws, not in
the exclusion of the parties. Gambling is considered by most states to be injurious to the
morals of their people, and is made a public
offense. It would hardly be considered as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
states to prevent a foreigner who had been a
gambler in his own country from landing in
ours. If, after landing, he pursues his former

Section 1101 (“Deﬁnitions”) mentions gambling
twice. First, in paragraph (a)(43), it deﬁnes the
term “aggravated felony” as including:

to assist. He alleges that he paid Cosgrove an advance of $5000 and agreed to
pay an additional $5000 when the funds were fully recovered.
Next, Huerta–Orosco alleges Cosgrove told him that upon recovery of the
full amount, he would deposit the funds into his client trust account and
would hold the funds in trust until Huerta–Orosco demanded them. He
contends that Cosgrove drafted a document for that purpose but that Huerta–
Orosco’s name was excluded from the document due to his immigration
status. He alleges being told that the agreement “was to recover the
$1,000,000 for him three ways through Cosgrove, Rosales, and Verbeski
which Cosgrove would deposit in [his] client-trust account in Defendant’s
name as Trustee for Plaintiff’s beneﬁt terminable at his will.”
Huerta–Orosco next alleges that he was incarcerated on federal drug charges
twenty days later but was not concerned about his winnings because he had
entrusted them to Cosgrove, as his attorney. He claims that over the next ﬁve
years, he made efforts to contact Cosgrove about the funds but that his calls
were not accepted. He then alleges that he wrote to Cosgrove in 2006 about
the funds and received letters from both Joe Cosgrove and Frank Cosgrove in
which they denied any knowledge of the situation. After that, Huerta–Orosco
alleges that he was transferred to another institution, causing him to lose
contact information and documents concerning this matter. However, he
alleges that he was able to write to Cosgrove again in 2010 to demand the
return of his funds and that he ﬁled this action after receiving no response.

questioned the legality. He ﬁrst learned that the machines were illegal when
the police raided the bar and conﬁscated the machines.

(J) an offense described in section 1962 of Title
18 [the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act] . . . or an offense
described in section 1084 [of the Interstate
Wire Act of 1961] (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 [the Illegal Gambling
Business Act of 1970] . . . for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be
imposed[.]9

N
Y
O
I
L
T
N
U
O
B
I
W ISTR
E
I
V
D ON
E
R
R
R
I
O
T
F
O
C
F
D
U
E
D
D
O
N
R
E
P
T
E
N
I
R
T
R
O
NO

Id. at 976–77 (footnote omitted).
L & L Doc’s, L.L.C. v. Florida Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 882 So. 2d
512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), review denied, 902 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2005), likewise
deserves a brief mention. After buying a bar, the purchasers sought to repudiate the
contract by arguing that they had been duped by the seller:
A few months after purchasing the restaurant, Latte [one of the two buyers]
was arrested and charged by the City of Fort Lauderdale with engaging in
gambling. The buyers subsequently defaulted on the note by failing to make
the required payments, and did not cure the default. As a result, seller ﬁled
suit. Buyers answered the complaint. . . . The thrust of their defenses was
that seller fraudulently misrepresented material facts relating to the conditions of the business and premises. Speciﬁcally, buyers asserted that (1) seller
had represented that the slot machines on the premises were a valid source of
revenue when he knew that gambling was illegal. . . .
[L]atte asserted that, because he is a recent immigrant to this country from
Italy, he was unaware that gambling is illegal in the state of Florida or that the
operation being run by Dressel [the seller’s president] was illegal. Moreover,
because the slot machines were being operated out in the open, Latte never

Id. at 513, 515. See also Park v. Comm’r, 722 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (foreign
gamblers permitted to calculate their gambling winnings and losses in the same
manner as U.S. citizens); Jombo v. Comm’r, 398 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noncitizen who won New York State Lottery was liable for U.S. taxes, notwithstanding
his claim of diplomatic immunity).
6

3 Sawy. 144 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).

7

Id. at 217. It should be noted that Justice Field’s comment constitutes dicta because
the government’s reason for excluding the petitioner was its contention that she was a
“lewd and debauched wom[a]n” (i.e., a prostitute rather than a gambler). Id. at 214.

8
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1778. The country’s ﬁrst immigration law was the Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. Since then, frequent amendments, as well
as wholesale revisions, have been made. See 1 SHANE DIZON AND POOJA DADHANIA,
IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE §§ 1:2–1:118 (2d ed. 2020). The present statutory
framework dates to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. 82414, 66 Stat. 163.
9
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(J). This wording is the product of changes made by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546:

Enacted in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, AEDPA reﬂected
both popular and legislative determination to deter and punish terrorism.
Notwithstanding President Clinton’s acknowledgment that the bill “made a
number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having
nothing to do with ﬁghting terrorism,” he signed the bill into law on April 24,
1996. Section 440(e) of AEDPA added new crimes to be considered aggravated felonies under section 101(a)(43) of the INA. The newly designated
aggravated felony crimes included gambling offenses and the transmission
of wagering information. . . .
A mere six months after the enactment of AEDPA, Congress passed IIRIRA,
this time devoting an entire bill solely to immigration law concerns. In contrast
to the rather hasty changes wrought by AEDPA, IIRIRA implemented far more
calculated, though equally far-reaching, amendments to United States immigration law. These changes included new additions and revisions to the aggravated felony deﬁnition. . . . Whereas RICO-related and gambling offenses
previously were aggravated felonies if they carried a potential sentence of ﬁve
years or more, IIRIRA . . . lowered this to one year.

5

6
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Second, in paragraph (f)(4)–(5), it provides:
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For the purposes of this chapter—
No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a
person of good moral character who, during the
period for which good moral character is required to be established is, or was . . .
(4) one whose income is derived principally
from illegal gambling activities; [or]
(5) one who has been convicted of two or more
gambling offenses committed during such period[.]10

respondent was convicted of operating an illegal
gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1955.13 In upholding his subsequent deportation
order, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)14 explained: “Notably, the respondent’s charge of deportability did not pertain to his conviction at all. Instead,
it simply referenced the fact that he had remained
in the United States for a time longer than that permitted by the non-immigrant visa he used to obtain
his admission.”15

III. ADMISSION

In addition to these speciﬁc provisions, § 1101 contains the following “catch-all” language: “The fact
that any person is not within any of the foregoing
classes shall not preclude a ﬁnding that for other
reasons such person is or was not of good moral
character.”11

Numerous individuals are classiﬁed as being ineligible for admission into the United States.16 The two
categories most relevant for present purposes are:
“commercialized vice” and “public charge.”

Other statutory sections also can come into play a
given case. In In re Sadrusi,12 for example, the

A person who seeks to enter the United States to engage in “commercialized vice” is inadmissible.17 As

Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets—Immigration Law’s
New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 589, 600–02 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).

making an overall assessment of good moral character. See section 101(f),
Immigration and Nationality Act. . . .
The respondent’s criminal record covers a span of 38 years, going back to
1930. During at least a portion of this time, the respondent’s income was
derived from gambling. The respondent’s most recent conviction, for a
felony, occurred within the ten-year period for which good moral character is
required, and he was imprisoned for a period just short of that which would
have precluded him from establishing good moral character. On these facts
we ﬁnd no evidence of the type of character reformation that would warrant a
ﬁnding of good moral character for the statutory period. Consequently, we
conclude that the respondent has failed to meet the good moral character
requirement of section 244(a)(2) of the Act. . . .
The respondent’s application for suspension of deportation under section
244(a)(2) of the Act must be denied both for failure to establish statutory
eligibility and in the exercise of discretion. The result reached by the immigration judge was correct. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

10
11
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A. Commercialized vice

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4)–(5).

8 U.S.C. § 1101. In Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016), the Court upheld the
catch-all provision and applied it to state crimes not involving interstate commerce.
In so ruling, the Court explained that it was rejecting the petitioner’s argument
because:
Luna’s [Torres’s preferred last name] view would limit the penultimate
sentence’s effect in a peculiarly perverse fashion—excluding state and
foreign convictions for many of the gravest crimes listed in § 1101(a)(43),
while reaching those convictions for less harmful offenses. Consider some of
the state and foreign crimes that would not count as aggravated felonies on
Luna’s reading because the corresponding federal law has a commerce element: most child pornography offenses, including selling a child for the
purpose of manufacturing such material, see § 1101(a)(43)(I); demanding or
receiving a ransom for kidnapping, see § 1101(a)(43)(H); and possessing a
ﬁrearm after a felony conviction, see § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). Conversely, the
term “aggravated felony” in Luna’s world would include state and foreign
convictions for such comparatively minor offenses as operating an unlawful
gambling business, see § 1101(a)(43)(J), and possessing a ﬁrearm not
identiﬁed by a serial number, see § 1101(a)(43)(E)(iii), because Congress
chose, for whatever reason, not to use a commerce element when barring that
conduct.

Id. at 1628.
In United States ex rel. Marcello v. Dist. Dir. I.N.S., New Orleans, La., 634 F.2d 964
(5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 641 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981),
the Fifth Circuit applied the catch-all provision to a foreign gambler:
Since the respondent served less than 180 days in prison for his 1968
conviction, he avoids the statutory bar to a ﬁnding of good moral character
contained in section 101(f)(7) of the Act. Since the respondent has not been
shown to have derived his income principally from gambling during the last
ten years, he also avoids the preclusion contained in section 101(f)(4) of the
Act. However, the fact that the respondent’s conduct is not within the
grounds enumerated by the statute does not prevent us from considering it in

Id. at 979.
12

2008 WL 2783052 (B.I.A. 2008).

13

Id. at *1 n.1.

14

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), part of the U.S. Department of Justice,
oversees the country’s immigration courts. See DIZON AND DADHANIA, supra note 8,
at §§ 1:183–1:192. It is just one of the many entities that handle immigration cases.
For a list and discussion of other relevant entities, see id. at §§ 1:119–1:224. See
also infra note 24.
15

Sadrusi, 2008 WL 2783052, at *2 n.2. For another such case, see Rathod v. Barr,
2020 WL 1492790 (W.D. La.), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
1501891 (W.D. La. 2020) (Indian citizen who pleaded guilty to keeping an illegal
gambling place ordered removed for overstaying his visitor visa).
16
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Among those barred are child abductors, drug abusers,
drunks, genocide participants, Nazis, polygamists, prostitutes, smugglers, spies,
and terrorists. See DIZON AND DADHANIA, supra note 8, at §§ 3:2–3:128.
17
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(iii) (“Any alien who—. . . is coming to the United
States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related
to prostitution, is inadmissible.”).
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one would expect, commercialized vice has been
held to include illegal gambling.18
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In In re Leong Youk Tong,19 a case decided before the
statute included the term “commercialized vice,” a
Chinese merchant who had emigrated to the United
States in 1891 took an overseas business trip in
1897.20 When he returned to the United States in
1898, he was refused admission and charged with
being the owner of a gambling-and-prostitution
house.21 In upholding this ﬁnding, the court wrote:
By the law of August 18, 1894, it is provided as
follows:
“In every case where an alien is excluded from
admission into the United States under any law
or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the
decision of the appropriate immigration or customs ofﬁcers, if adverse to the admission of such
alien, shall be ﬁnal, unless reversed on appeal to
the secretary of the treasury.”
....
[T]he evidence shows that, after announcing his
decision, the collector proceeded to take further
evidence, which tended to show that the petitioner was not in reality a merchant, but that he
had carried on a pretended business as a merchant as a blind, and with the object of remaining
within the United States and giving his attention
to other occupations. Whether the evidence was
sufﬁcient to sustain that conclusion it is unnecessary to consider. . . . The testimony which
was offered in this case by the petitioner’s
counsel, and rejected by the collector, was

thereafter presented to the secretary of the treasury on the appeal. It follows from the afﬁrmance
of the collector’s decision by the secretary either
that the purport of such evidence was not deemed
sufﬁcient to reverse the decision of the collector,
or that its exclusion by him was not held erroneous. The petitioner must be remanded to his
custody.22
The same result has obtained in more recent cases. In
In re Applicant,23 for example, the Administrative
Appeals Ofﬁce (AAO)24 wrote:
The applicant has pled guilty to multiple offenses related to illegal gambling, including:
Disorderly Conduct under New York Penal
Law § 240.20 [in] 1998 after being charged
with Possession of Gambling Records in the
2nd Degree under New York Penal Law §
225.15 and Promoting Gambling in the 2nd
Degree under New York Penal Law § 225.05;
Attempted Possession of Gambling Records in
the 2nd Degree under New York Penal Law §
110-225.15 [in] 2006; Possession of Gambling
Records in the 2nd Degree under New York
Penal Law § 225.15 [in] 2006; and Promoting
Gambling in the 2nd Degree under New York
Penal Law § 225.05 [in] 2007. Based on this
lengthy pattern of engaging in activities related
to illegal gambling, the director found that the
applicant is seeking admission to the United
States “to engage in [an] unlawful commercialized vice,” and thus she is inadmissible
under section 212(a)(2)(D)(iii) of the Act. . . .
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18

See Matter of B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 98 (B.I.A. 1954), where the BIA reasoned:
The statute uses the phrase “unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not
related to prostitution.” There does not appear to have been any deﬁnition
given or discussion had as to the meaning of these words by the various
congressional committees, or in the debate in Congress. . . .
Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed. (1940) contains as one of the
deﬁnitions of the word “commercialize” the following: “speciﬁcally to cause
to yield pecuniary proﬁt; as, to commercialize vice.” Thus, “commercialized
gambling” is such gambling as is a source of sure and steady proﬁt (State v.
Gardner, 92 So. 368, 371, 151 La. 874 (Sup. Ct., 1922)). The word “vice” is
deﬁned as “state of being given up to evil conduct or habit; depravity;
wickedness; corruption.” While the phrase “commercialized vice” has been
referred to as “trafﬁc in women for gain,” or “immoralities having a mercenary purpose” (Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 484, 497
(1917)), the court there was speaking of the White Slave Trafﬁc Act which
relates speciﬁcally to prostitution. However, in the provision of law under
discussion, the phrase “commercialized vice” is enlarged by the use of the
words “whether or not related to prostitution.” It was, therefore, clearly
intended by Congress that in construing the phrase “commercialized vice,”
the deﬁnition was not to be ejusdem generis with prostitution but was to be
given meaning wider in scope.

Id. at 101–02 (italics in original).
19

90 F. 648 (C.C.D. Or. 1898).

20

Id. at 648.

21

Id. at 648–49.

22

Id. at 649–50. For a case reaching the opposite result, see Chin Hong v. Nagle, 7
F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1925) (son could not be denied admission because his father, a
Chinese merchant, spent much of his time running an illegal lottery in Monterey).
Although the court rested its decision on the fact that the father also ran a legitimate
restaurant, it likely was swayed by the fact that the son had no ties to his father’s
gambling activities.
23

2011 WL 10878054 (A.A.O. 2011).

24

The AAO, more formerly known as the Ofﬁce of Administrative Appeals (OAA),
is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is responsible for
reviewing visa application denials. See DIZON AND DADHANIA, supra note 8, at §§
1:126, 1:154.

7

8

JARVIS : GAMBLING AND THE U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS : [2021] 1 GLR

Downloaded by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers from www.liebertpub.com at 03/22/21. For personal use only.

As noted above, the applicant was convicted of
an offense related to her gambling activities on
October 7, 1998. She subsequently departed the
United States, then reentered on July 18, 2000 in
B-2 status and has remained since. The applicant
was convicted of three more separate gambling
offenses which suggests she intended to return to
the United States for the purpose of continuing to
reside indeﬁnitely to engage in an unlawful
commercialized vice. . . . 25
In Matter of A-,26 the BIA found that there was no
credible evidence that the respondent had sought to
enter the United States to engage in commercialized vice:

In United States v. Iqbal,28 the government charged
that Shahid Iqbal had immigrated to the United
States to help his brother, Tariq Majeed, in an illegal
gambling operation that the latter had set up in Austin, Texas.29 To prove its case before the immigration judge, the government sought to introduce
the presentence investigation report (PSR) from Iqbal’s criminal case, in which Iqbal had pled guilty to
structuring currency transactions to evade U.S. reporting requirements.30 When Iqbal objected, the
Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, held
that the report was admissible:
DHS initiated removal proceedings against Iqbal
in October 2008 on the theory Iqbal immigrated to engage in unlawful commercialized
vice through Tariq’s illegal gambling enterprise.
DHS attempted to introduce Iqbal’s PSR to
demonstrate that Iqbal immigrated to the U.S. to
assist in Tariq’s gambling operations notwithstanding the district court’s contrary ﬁnding. . . .
During sentencing, Iqbal vigorously contested
the inclusion of multiple statements in the PSR,
including his participation in Tariq’s gambling
ring, his knowledge of illegal activity prior to
entering the U.S., and the PSR’s calculation of
the amount of laundered funds. The district court
speciﬁcally found that Iqbal had no knowledge
of Tariq’s illegal enterprise before Iqbal entered
the U.S. . . .
But the inaccuracies are, in the end, not cause for
concern. The sentencing court’s rulings favoring
Iqbal on PSR objections are matters of public
record. The court’s redactions eliminated the
possibility that other embarrassing or personal
information would come to light. These circumstances lead us to conclude the district court did
not abuse its discretion in holding that the public
interest in disclosure of Iqbal’s redacted PSR to
the immigration judge outweighed his remaining
privacy interest against the dissemination of inaccurate information.31

N
Y
O
I
L
T
N
U
O
B
I
W ISTR
E
I
V
D ON
E
R
R
R
I
O
T
F
O
C
F
D
U
E
D
D
O
N
R
E
P
T
E
N
I
R
T
R
O
NO
We come now to the fourth charge relating to the
alien’s participation in commercialized vice. The
evidence establishes that from 1929 to 1931 and
from 1939 to 1950, the alien earned his livelihood in illegal activities relating to the sale of
liquor, the taking of numbers, and other gambling activities. His income from the operation of
his illegal enterprises, in the later years, ran about
$25,000 a year. He was convicted on several
occasions for violation of lottery laws and on one
occasion for violation of bootlegging laws. He is
charged with being deportable under section 241
(a) (12) of the act of 1952 which makes deportable certain aliens who engaged in “unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not
related to prostitution.” The charge cannot be
sustained. . . .
[T]he record does not establish that the alien
herein was coming to the United States to engage
in commercialized vice in 1922 and while there
is some indication in connection with the alleged
entry in 1931 that he reentered to pursue illegal
activity in bootlegging[,] narcotics, or counterfeiting, it is not substantial evidence and the fact
of entry is not established. The fourth charge will
not be sustained.27

25

Applicant, 2011 WL 10878054, at *2–*3.

26

6 I. & N. Dec. 540 (B.I.A. 1954).

establish that the applicant was coming to the United States to engage in gambling.”).
28

27

Id. at 553. For other such cases, see In re Applicant, 2009 WL 5240349, at *3 (A.
A.O. 2009) (holding that the applicant’s 1995 and 1998 gambling convictions were
too remote in time to cause one “to believe that the applicant is now seeking admission to the United States to engage in commercialized vice.”); In re Application,
2008 WL 4052573, at *3 (A.A.O. 2008) (“With the case here, the record does not

684 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2012).

29

Id. at 509.

30

Id. at 508–09.

31

Id. at 509, 511–12 (footnote omitted).
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B. Public charge
A non-citizen also can be excluded if it is likely that
he or she will become a “public charge.”32 In Lam
Fung Yen v. Frick,33 the Sixth Circuit held that the
petitioner could be denied entry because he planned
to make his living by illegal gambling and therefore
was likely to become a public charge:
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[I]n United States v. Williams[, 175 F. 274, 275
(S.D.N.Y. 1910)], the term “persons likely to
become a public charge” is construed as including, “not only those persons who through
misfortune cannot be self-supporting, but also
those who will not undertake honest pursuits,
and who are likely to become periodically the
inmates of prisons.” We think this a reasonable
construction. “A statute excluding paupers or
persons likely to become a public charge is
manifestly one of police and public security.”
[Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97
(1903).] Inmates of jails and prisons are for the
time being public charges, and we think it open
to conclusion by reasonable minds that those
who will not work for a living, but rely for that
purpose upon gambling, are more likely than
citizens following the ordinary pursuits of industry to become, at least intermittently, public
charges.
Such conclusion does not involve the proposition that gambling in any and every form is
necessarily immoral; but public policy generally, as disclosed in statutes of varying nature,
regards professional gambling at least as within
the domain of police supervision and public
security. . . .
We therefore conclude that it was open to the
Secretary of Labor to ﬁnd that petitioner was at
the time of his entry into the United States a
person “likely to become a public charge,” [and]
excluded by . . . the Immigration Act. . . . 34

This rather strained construction of the statute was
rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Ng Fung Ho v.
White:35
Lui Yee Law was arrested on departmental
warrant dated February 16, 1918. . . . He had
originally entered in 1915 as a merchant. . . .
He was arraigned, had a hearing, was represented by counsel, and in due course was
ordered deported, and warrant issued. In a judicial proceeding, had some time before the
present proceeding, it was held that, although
the mercantile status of the alien when he entered the United States had not been successfully challenged, nevertheless there was
evidence to sustain the Department of Labor in
holding that the man was a gambler, and had
been a gambler for some months before his
arrest, and thus the question was raised whether he was a person likely to become a public
charge. The evidence tended to show that about
January, 1918, the alien lived in Texas, where
he was a professional gambler; that about that
time he was arrested in a gambling room; that
he pleaded guilty to the charge of gambling and
was ﬁned $25. . . . [U]pon the evidence we are
unable to ﬁnd that the alien was likely to become a public charge at the time he entered the
United States. Having entered in 1915 . . . and
not having been a public charge, we cannot see
that an arrest in January, 1918, and a plea of
guilty, and the payment of a ﬁne of $25 tend to
prove that the alien had criminal tendencies
when he arrived in the United States, or was
likely to become a public charge. . . . 36
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Later cases of this sort do not exist. This is because
the public charge exception has fallen into disuse
in modern times.37 As a result, the conﬂict created by Lam Fung Yen and Ng Fung Ho remains
unresolved.

32

36

33

37

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A).
233 F. 393 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 642 (1916).

34

Id. at 396–97.

35

266 F. 765 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 254 U.S. 628 (1920), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).

Id. at 768–69.

Recently, however, the Trump Administration has attempted to breathe new life
into it. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. ﬁled, Docket No. 20-449 (Oct. 7, 2020); Cook Cnty., Ill. v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. ﬁled, Docket No. 20-450 (Oct. 7, 2020).
See also Catherine S. Ramírez, Immigrants and the Wealth Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2020, at A27.
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C. Admission because of legal gambling
Although illegal gambling typically will keep a noncitizen out of the United States, in at least three instances
legal gambling can help him or her get admitted.
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First, a foreign gambler who intends to play in legal
games, and is highly skilled, may be able to qualify
for an O-1A visa, which is available to non-citizens
“with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics.”38 This provision currently
is being used by various professional poker players.39
Second, a non-citizen working for a legal gambling
business in a foreign country may be able to qualify
for an L1-A visa, which permits intra-company transfers of qualiﬁed executives and managers.40

ples include: committing an act of moral turpitude
within ﬁve years of admission, or within 10 years
of becoming a lawful permanent resident;43 carrying out two separate crimes involving moral turpitude at any time;44 or perpetrating an aggravated
felony at any time.45
In Matter of S-K-C-,46 the respondent argued that he
had not committed a gambling crime because he
merely had been a dealer in an illegal gambling establishment.47 In rejecting this assertion, the BIA
wrote:
It is contended by counsel that the respondent was a mere employee at the Bataan
Recreation Club and cannot be said to have
been gambling if he did not handle the
money nor receive any of the winnings. No
authority is cited for the contention. We . . .
conclude that the salary received by the respondent as a dealer in the Bataan Recreation
Club was income derived from gambling
activities.48

N
Y
O
I
L
T
N
U
O
B
I
W ISTR
E
I
V
D ON
E
R
R
R
I
O
T
F
O
C
F
D
U
E
D
D
O
N
R
E
P
T
E
N
I
R
T
R
O
NO

Third, a non-citizen who plans to invest substantial
funds in a legal gambling business may be able to
qualify for an E-2/EB-5 investor visa.41

IV. DEPORTATION

Foreigners who break the law while living in the
United States are subject to deportation.42 Exam38
39

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A).

See Terrence Chan, Lawyer Links, LIVEJOURNAL (Nov. 10, 2010), https://
terrencechan.livejournal.com/355654.html (reporting that Dallas immigration attorney Steve Ladik “has acted as the attorney for about 20 players from other
countries who are currently playing poker professionally in the United States.”). In
2009, Hall of Fame Canadian poker player Daniel “Kid Poker” Negreanu became a
lawful permanent resident after winning four World Series of Poker bracelets and
two World Poker Tour titles. See Daniel Negreanu, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Negreanu (under “Personal
Life”). In 2016, Negreanu became a U.S. citizen. See Kevin Nielsen, Canadian
Poker Star Becomes American to Vote Against Donald Trump, GLOBAL NEWS (Mar.
12, 2016) https://globalnews.ca/news/2574593/canadian-poker-star-becomesamerican-to-vote-against-trump/.
In In re Petitioner, 2009 WL 1450808 (A.A.O. 2009), a South African lawyer sought to
gain admission by claiming she had extraordinary abilities as an attorney. Among other
matters, she pointed to the fact that she had served as the lead attorney in the case that
resulted in the legalization of gambling in South Africa. Agreeing with the immigration
judge, the AAO found that the awarding of gambling licenses did not constitute “a
contribution of major signiﬁcance to the petitioner’s ﬁeld of law.” Id. at *4.

funds [and improperly used them] at gambling establishments around the country.”
Id. at *4.

42
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Even where deportation is not threatened, a non-citizen with
gambling convictions can suffer other consequences. In In re Applicant, 2009 WL
1742959 (A.A.O. 2009), for example, the applicant’s request to adjust her status to
permanent resident was denied because she had three misdemeanor gambling
convictions. See also In re Applicant, 2009 WL 1450635 (A.A.O. 2009) (same
result on nearly identical facts).
43

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The act must be punishable as a felony. Id.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The two crimes cannot arise “out of a single
scheme of criminal misconduct,” but they can be charged “in a single trial.” Id. For
a case rejecting a gambler’s claim that his various crimes fell within the “single
scheme” exemption because they all had the same goal—to get him out of debt—
see Matter of Vosganian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1966).
44

45
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In Vella v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 742 F. App’x 623
(3d Cir. 2018), the petitioner’s order of deportation, based on his 2015 guilty plea to
a charge of extortion, was upheld. As the court noted, an earlier attempt to deport
him for illegal gambling failed:

40

See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C). In Matter of 5-C-USA Corp., 2018 WL 3036039
(A.A.O. 2018), and Matter of 5-U- Corp., 2019 WL 4954795 (A.A.O. 2019), an
online gambling company wanted to transfer one of its foreign employees to the
United States to serve as its local general manager, but its request was denied
because the employee did not possess the necessary qualiﬁcations.

Vella, a native and citizen of Italy, was admitted to the United States as a lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”) in 1967, at age twelve. In 2007, he was convicted
of conspiracy to operate an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 and was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment. Two years later, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged him with removability
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony offense. He was subsequently granted adjustment of status.

41

See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5). The use of this provision to fund gambling enterprises
is described in Glenn Light et al., EB-5 Financing of Resort Hotel Casinos, CASINO
ENTER. MGMT., July 2013, at 18, available at https://www.lrrc.com/ﬁles/Uploads/
Documents/LightRutledge_0713.pdf.
In Tocara Invs. v. Johnson, 2017 WL 985644 (D. Nev. 2017), a Canadian citizen was
denied an investor visa because he could not prove that his funds came from legitimate sources. Although he claimed his money was “from gambling winnings,
[the] USCIS reasonably determined that Minci failed to prove this fact [because]
Minci’s tax returns indicated that he gambled away most of his ‘winnings.’” Id. at *4.
In Matter of P-A-S-, LLC, 2017 WL 6603966 (A.A.O. 2017), the company’s participation in the EB-5 program was threatened after its principal “withdrew investor

Id. at 624.
46

8 I. & N. Dec. 185 (B.I.A. 1958).

47

Id. at 187.

48

Id. For another such case, see Yee Look v. Burnett, 65 F.2d 594, 594 (9th Cir.
1933) (ﬁnding it sufﬁcient “that the alien at and for about a week before his arrest
was employed in a gambling resort[.]”).
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In Rong Chen v. Holder,49 the petitioner ran an illegal
internet café in China.50 When the Chinese government sought to arrest him, he ﬂed to the United
States.51 Upon learning of his presence, the U.S. government began deportation proceedings52 and the petitioner sought asylum.53 In rejecting his request, the
Fifth Circuit explained:

but because he was running an illegal business.
And because Chen did not establish grounds for
asylum, it follows that Chen also cannot meet
the more stringent burden for withholding of
removal.54

A. Moral turpitude
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Chen ﬁrst argues that he faces persecution for his
membership in a social group which he identiﬁes
as “the internet gaming community.” To be eligible for asylum, however, the social group
“must share a common immutable characteristic
that they cannot change or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Mwembie v.
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir.2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Chen presented no evidence that membership in
the online gaming community is so fundamental
to one’s identity or conscience that it functions as
an immutable characteristic. Indeed, Chen was
primarily involved with internet gaming as a
means of employment, and we have held that
one’s occupation is normally not so fundamental
that it can be considered immutable. Id. at 415.
Chen also argues that he was subject to persecution for his political opinions, but he has not
offered any evidence that he was singled out for
any political views. To the contrary, there is
substantial evidence to support the IJ’s determination that Chen’s café was seized because it
was engaged in unlawful gambling and because
it was using pirated computer software. Chen
fails to identify any persecution by the Chinese
government except for the closing of his illegal
business.
The record supports the IJ’s conclusion that
Chen was not persecuted on account of political
opinion or membership in any protected group,

Courts generally do not view illegal gambling as
a crime involving “moral turpitude.”55 In United
States v. Carrollo,56 for example, the court
explained:
This alien has received three sentences of imprisonment for a year or more for these offenses: (1) Perjury, in violation of Section 231,
Title 18, U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.A. § 231; (2)
Mailing a letter concerning a lottery, in violation of Section 336, Title 18, U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.
A. § 336; (3) Attempting to evade a tax, in
violation of Section 145(b), Title 26, U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C.A. § 145(b). . . .
We are not prepared to rule that writing a letter
concerning a lottery, even for the purpose of
selling an interest in it, is an act of “baseness,
vileness or depravity.” On the contrary we think
it would be ridiculous to say it is such an act.
Even conducting a lottery is not such an act.
Churches and states have conducted lotteries
and they do so now where laws do not prohibit
lotteries.57
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49

395 F. App’x 93 (5th Cir. 2010).

50

Id. at 94.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 95. For other such cases, see Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 81 F. App’x 695 (9th
Cir. 2003) (denying asylum to a petitioner who claimed he was forced to operate an
illegal casino in the Philippines); Fadul v. I.N.S., 210 F.3d 374 (Table), 2000 WL

More recently, in United States v. Chu Kong Yin,58
the Ninth Circuit wrote:
The government ﬁrst argues that gambling is a
crime of moral turpitude. The record of conviction for Chu’s gambling offense merely states
that he was convicted under section 6, ch. 148 of
the Hong Kong Laws. This section provides:

302680 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying asylum to a petitioner who, while working in his
uncle’s casino in the Philippines, was targeted by armed rebels).
55
For a critique of the current tests used to determine whether a crime involves
moral turpitude, see Rob Doersam, Note, Punishing Harmless Conduct: Toward a
New Deﬁnition of “Moral Turpitude” in Immigration Law, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 547
(2018).
56

30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1939).

57

Id. at 6–7.

58

935 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Any person who gambles in a gambling establishment commits an offence and is liable on
conviction to a ﬁne of $10,000 and to imprisonment for 3 months.
Hong Kong Laws, ch. 148, § 6. In support of its
contention that gambling is a crime involving
moral turpitude, the government cites dicta from
Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d
527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876. 99 S.
Ct. 214, 58 L.Ed.2d 190 (1978), which refers to
“gambling, game-throwing or other conduct
associated with moral turpitude” in discussing
the power[s] of the Commissioner of Major
League Baseball. Id. at 537.
The government also points to Chief Inspector
Hawkesley’s testimony that Chu hid under a
table during a [Hong Kong] gambling raid and
argues that Chu “displayed conscious knowledge of guilt of a morally undesirable crime.”
These arguments are not persuasive. . . .
Moreover, the Board of Immigration Appeals
has held that gambling offenses are not crimes of
moral turpitude as that term is used in our immigration laws. See In re Gaglioti, 10 I. & N.
Dec. 719, 721 (1964) (“[T]he substantive crime
or crimes involved in the gambling conspiracy
charge do not involve moral turpitude.”): In re G,
1 I. & N. Dec. 59, 61–62 (1941) (because
gambling is “not generally regarded as morally
wrong or corrupt, as offensive to the moral sense
as ordinarily developed,” it is not a crime of
moral turpitude). We ﬁnd the Board’s reasoning
persuasive and hold that Chu’s conviction for
gambling is legally insufﬁcient to support the
conclusion that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.59
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dismissed his appeal.63 The respondent then moved
for reconsideration, which the BIA denied.64 In explaining its reasoning, the BIA wrote:
Public bribery under the pertinent Louisiana
statute involves the “giving or offering to give,
directly or indirectly, of anything of apparent . . . value” to any public ofﬁcer, public
employee, or person in a position of public
authority if the item of value is given “with
intent to inﬂuence the public ofﬁcial’s . . .
conduct in relation to his position, employment,
or duty.” See Louisiana Revised Statute Title
14, section 118. Bribery offenses, like the
foregoing have generally been deemed to involve moral turpitude, while illegal gambling
activities have not. See Matter of Gaglioti, 10
I&N Dec. 719 (BIA 1964) (ﬁnding gambling is
not a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter
of H-, 6 I&N Dec. 358, 361 (BIA 1954) (ﬁnding
bribery to be a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of V-, 4 I&N Dec. 100, 101-02
(BIA 1950) (same). Therefore, in the absence of
evidence clearly establishing whether the
gambling activity, the bribery, or both supported the racketeering charge, the respondent
has not provided sufﬁcient evidence to demonstrate that he has not been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. . . . 65
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While gambling ordinarily is not a crime involving
moral turpitude, it becomes one when it involves
fraud:
The record reﬂects that during the period 1988–
1997, the Applicant had multiple convictions
under section 330 (gambling) and section 332
(obtaining money by gaming fraud) of the California Penal Code (PC). The Applicant was
also convicted of theft under 484(a) PC in 1993.
We ﬁnd the Applicant’s convictions under

In In re Dimopoulos,60 however, the respondent was
ordered deported61 after pleading guilty to both racketeering and conducting an illegal gambling business.62 When he challenged the order, the BIA
59

Id. at 1003–04. In addition to G- and Gaglioti, the BIA also found that gambling
is not a crime of moral turpitude in Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 688, 696 (B.I.A.
1962): “The special inquiry ofﬁcer found that gambling and owning and operating a
gambling establishment and being a common gambler under sections 970 and 973
of the New York Penal Code are not crimes involving moral turpitude. We
agree. . . . ” The AAO has reached the same conclusion in numerous cases, including: In re Applicant, 2009 WL 1742846, at *2 (A.A.O. 2009) (citing Gaglioti);
In re Applicant, 2008 WL 5063583, at *2 (A.A.O. 2008) (also citing Gaglioti); In re
Application, 2008 WL 4968645, at *2 (A.A.O. 2008) (citing G-); In re Application,
2008 WL 4052447, at *2 (A.A.O. 2008) (citing S- and Gaglioti).

60

2011 WL 2261207 (B.I.A. 2011).

61

Id. at *1.

62

Id. at *5.

63

Id. at *1.

64

Id. at *6.

65

Id. at *5.
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section 332 PC and 484(a) PC to be for crimes
involving moral turpitude. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals[] addressed the issue of
whether a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 484
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude in
Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, ﬁnding
that a conviction for theft (grand or petty) under
the California Penal Code requires the speciﬁc
intent to deprive the victim of his or her property permanently and is, therefore, a crime involving moral turpitude. With regard to the
Applicant’s convictions for obtaining money by
gaming fraud, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jordan v. De George concluded that “Whatever
else the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude
may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases
make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. . . . Fraud is the
touchstone by which this case should be judged.
The phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’
has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.” 341 U.S. 223, 232
(1951). The Applicant does not contest that he
has been convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude.66

In Blake v. Carbone,68 the Second Circuit observed:
While a number of aggravated felonies require
intentional conduct, not all are inherently base
and vile. Two or more gambling offenses, for
instance, may render a lawful permanent resident deportable for having committed an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J),
but the BIA has held that gambling is not a
crime involving moral turpitude, see In the
Matter of G-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 59 (B.I.A.1941).
Crimes involving moral turpitude and aggravated felonies are two broad classes of criminal
conduct. Were we to conclude that such
breadth signaled congruency, we would be
extending the scope of [the immigration laws]
to a potentially different, and perhaps much
larger, class of persons than necessary. . . . 69
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Although the issue has not yet been judicially decided, illegal gambling that involves the exploitation
of animals almost certainly constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.67
66

B. Aggravated felony

Matter of I-H-C-, 2016 WL 8316072, at *2 n.1 (A.A.O. 2016). See also Matter of
Scherbank, 10 I. & N. Dec. 522, 523–25 (B.I.A. 1964) (because lawful permanent
resident went to Canada to engage in “cheating at play,” exclusion was appropriate); In re Applicant, 2014 WL 3898965, at *3 (A.A.O. 2014) (“The director
noted that although running an illegal gambling scheme has been found not to
involve moral turpitude, the separate offense of cheating at a legal gambling game
does involve fraud and moral turpitude. . . . Consequently, the director’s decision
to deny the application on these grounds will be afﬁrmed.”).

Because of the wording of § 1101(a)(43)(J), only
racketeering and gambling-related offenses fall within its purview. In Quinteros v. Attorney General of
the United States,70 for example, the petitioner, while
a member of the gang MS-13, helped to threaten several members of a rival gang.71 After pleading guilty
to conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous
weapon and serving his sentence, the government
sought to deport him on various grounds.72 In rejecting the government’s inclusion of § 1101(a)(43)(J) in
its charges, the Third Circuit wrote:
Dominican Republic, cockﬁghting is celebrated as a symbol of the country’s
warrior spirit. Nearly every neighborhood and country village has a gallera, or
cockﬁghting arena, and the sport is legal and regulated.”).
In Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382 (B.I.A. 2018), a non-citizen was
ordered deported for cockﬁghting. The opinion does not mention whether gambling
was involved. As has been explained elsewhere, however, cockﬁghting almost
always involves gambling:
Gambling is the norm at cockﬁghts. Thousands of dollars can exchange
hands as spectators and animal owners wager large sums on their favorite
birds. The owners of birds who win the most ﬁghts in a derby (a series of
cockﬁghts) may win tens of thousands of dollars of presumably unreported
income. Firearms and other weapons are common at cockﬁghts, mainly
because of the large amounts of cash present.

67

In In re Applicant, 2015 WL 1305711 (A.A.O. 2015), the applicant was found
deportable because of his marijuana conviction. Id. at *3–*4. In a footnote,
however, the AAO added:
The record further indicates that in 2003, the applicant was arrested under
New York Agricultural and Markets Law §351, prohibition of animal
ﬁghting, and New York Penal Law §225.05, promoting gambling in the
second degree. The record indicates that the applicant was convicted on a
plea of guilty, and sentenced [to] probation for a term of three years. As the
applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act, we ﬁnd
it is unnecessary to examine whether the applicant is further inadmissible
under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for committing a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Id. at *1 n.1. Although the opinion does not provide any further details, it is likely
that the applicant, who was from the Dominican Republic, was involved in
cockﬁghting. See Katie Thomas, A Question of Culture: Dominicans Say Cockﬁghting is in Their Blood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at D1 (explaining that “in the

Cockﬁghting Fact Sheet, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.
humanesociety.org/resources/cockﬁghting-fact-sheet.
68

489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).

69

Id. at 103.

70

945 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2019).

71

Id. at 777.

72

Id. at 777–78.
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Quinteros’s conviction for conspiracy to
commit assault with a dangerous weapon is not
an aggravated felony as deﬁned in § 1101(a)
(43)(J). Subsection J makes an aggravated
felony any offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§
1084, 1955, or 1962. Sections 1084 and 1955
deal only with gambling-related offenses—for
which Quinteros’s conviction cannot be a
categorical match. This leaves offenses described in 18 U.S.C. § 1962, which fall under
the general category of racketeering offenses.
Although Quinteros’s statute of conviction
for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon bears the title of “violent
crimes in aid of racketeering activity,” § 1959
(a)(6) has little in common with the offenses
in § 1962.73

and . . . has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty
days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single
day.”77 In In re Calderon-Figueroa,78 the respondent was ordered deported after an Arkansas state
court found him guilty of running an illegal gambling house.79 Because the Arkansas statute did
not include the scope and size provisions contained in § 1955, the respondent argued he had
not committed an aggravated felony.80 The BIA
disagreed:
The respondent asserts that his conviction under
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-66-103 does not qualify
as an aggravated felony because the Arkansas
statute is broader than 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and
because the record of conviction contained in the
administrative record does not reﬂect that his
particular conviction was for an offense that
involved the operation of an “illegal gambling
business” within the meaning fo [sic] 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955(b)(1). . . .
As applied to this case, we conclude that the
Arkansas offense of operating a gambling house
in violation of ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-66-103 is
“an offense described in” 18 U.S.C. § 1955
because all the conduct punishable under that
statute—whether it be operating a gambling
house directly, exhibiting and setting up gambling devices, or furnishing the ﬁnancial resources for maintaining such a house or
devices—would entail the “conducting” of a
gambling business within the meaning of section
1955(a). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, one
“conducts” an illegal gambling business within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) by performing any necessary function in the gambling
operation, other than that of a mere bettor. United
States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1349 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979). Accordingly,
we ﬁnd no reversible error in the Immigration
Judge’s determination that the respondent’s
conviction under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-66103 renders him removable as an alien convicted
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Similarly, in In re Yunguang Zhang,74 the respondent
was convicted of money laundering (18 U.S.C. §
1956), but the immigration judge decided he could
be deported for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955 because
the laundered money came from illegal gambling.75
In disagreeing, the BIA wrote:
In the case before us, we do not have a situation
in which the respondent’s conviction was for a
crime that is “similar to” an offense under 18 U.
S.C. § 1955. The prohibition on money laundering found at 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is completely
different from the prohibition on illegal gambling businesses found at 18 U.S.C. § 1955. If
this were not the case, there would be no reason
to have two separate and distinct sections in the
federal criminal code.
Accordingly, we will sustain the respondent’s
appeal from the Immigration Judge’s decision
insofar as the Immigration Judge found the
respondent was convicted of an aggravated
felony under section 101 (a)(43)(J) of the
INA. . . . 76

Section 1955 deﬁnes an “illegal gambling business”
as one that “involves ﬁve or more persons . . .
Id. at 785.

77

74

2005 WL 3952739 (B.I.A. 2005).

78

75

Id. at *2.

79

Id. at *3.

80

73

76

18 § U.S.C. 1955(b)(1)(ii)–(iii).
2006 WL 1558706 (B.I.A. 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
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of an aggravated felony within the meaning of
section 101(a)(43)(J).81
In Sanchez v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,82 however, a district court reached the
opposite conclusion. Sanchez was convicted under
California’s illegal gambling house statute.83 Subsequently, he sought to become a naturalized citizen,
but his application was rejected.84 When he challenged this decision, the government moved for summary judgment.85 In denying the motion, the court
wrote:
Downloaded by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers from www.liebertpub.com at 03/22/21. For personal use only.

It is not clear from the face of 18 U.S.C. § 1955
that the limitations on the size and scope of the
operation at issue are “purely jurisdictional.” . . . Congress knows how to state a simple
“interstate commerce nexus” element to a federal crime—examples abound in Title 18. That
it chose not to do so suggests that it meant more
to the size and scope elements in § 1955 than a
simple jurisdictional concern. Indeed, the legislative history of § 1955 is clear that it was
meant to apply only to “illegal gambling of
major proportions” and does not apply “to
gambling that is sporadic or of insigniﬁcant
proportions.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 1970 U.
S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4029. . . .
There is also reason to believe that Congress
intended to substantively limit the deﬁnition of
an “aggravated felony” by importing the size and
scope elements of § 1955 into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(43). Congress has speciﬁcally limited other
deﬁned aggravated felonies to violations of
certain statutes where loss was over a certain
amount. . . . Also, the legislative history of §
1101(a)(43) shows that Congress intended to
limit aggravated felonies to “only the most serious crimes” and intended to deﬁne “certain

gambling offenses” as aggravated felonies. H.R.
Rep. No. 104-22 (1995). . . .
All of these considerations lead to a conclusion
that the size and scope elements of 18 U.S.C. §
1955 should not be disregarded and that a violation of California Penal Code § 337a(1) is not
categorically an aggravated felony. The motion
for summary judgment is DENIED.86

V. CITIZENSHIP
To become a naturalized American citizen, an applicant must demonstrate: (1) continuous residence in
the United States “for at least ﬁve years and during
the ﬁve years immediately preceding the date of ﬁling” of his or her application for citizenship; (2) continuous residence within the United States “from
the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship”; and, (3) “good moral character,
attach[ment] to the principles of the Constitution of
the United States, and . . . dispos[ition] to the good
order and happiness of the United States.”87
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81

Id. at *2, *4.

82

2014 WL 12570172 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

83

Id. at * 1.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id. at *2–*3.

87

8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).

It should be noted that ﬁling an application for citizenship triggers a new
background check, which can result in an order of removal. In the Dimopoulos case
88

Three relatively old cases have considered whether
an applicant should be denied citizenship because
his or her gambling activities demonstrate a lack of
good moral character.88 In each, the petitioner lost.
In In re Vouraxakis,89 the court explained:

There is no record of his employment for 24
years after he arrived in the United States. He
was a partner in a restaurant in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, for about seven months from 1944
to 1949. He stated that from 1927 to 1941, while
he was unemployed, his only income was from
betting on horse races and prize ﬁghts and card
games. He was arrested on gambling charges on
three occasions, the last within ﬁve years prior to
the ﬁling of the petition, and paid ﬁnes. He was

discussed supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text, for example, Dimopoulos’s
2004 application for citizenship led the government to take a fresh look at his 1980
gambling conviction and, based on it, begin removal proceedings. See Dimopoulos
v. Blakeway, 2007 WL 922224 (S.D. Tex.), reconsideration denied, 2007 WL
1052551 (S.D. Tex. 2007). See also Zekic v. Rodriguez, 2015 WL 12751505, at *1
(W.D. Tex. 2015) (declining to consider the petitioner’s application for citizenship
after learning that he was in the middle of removal proceedings based on “his Texas
state-court convictions for gambling promotion, keeping a gambling place, and
possession of a gambling device. . . . ”).
89

115 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Pa. 1953).

15
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never in the armed forces of the United States
and never in industry at any time. He supported
himself by gambling and borrowing money from
friends. He has never contributed anything of
any kind to the welfare of the United States. He
resided in the United States for approximately 37
years before he petitioned to become a citizen.
The road to citizenship is not spectacular but it is
slow, dull day-by-day plugging, and without glory.
It is working with your hearts, with your hands and
with your minds, and loving your neighbor as
yourself. It is loving America and obeying its laws.
This petitioner has failed to meet the test required
of a person applying for citizenship in the United
States, and his petition will be denied by an
appropriate order.90

respondent has failed to prove good moral
character as required.
The judgment below granting citizenship is reversed and the petition is denied.92
Lastly, in Petition of Lee Wee,93 the petitioner argued
that the government’s refusal to grant him citizenship
based on where his gambling took place was unconstitutional.94 In rejecting this contention, the court wrote:
While the petitioner admits at least four convictions for violation of the Los Angeles City Ordinance prohibiting gambling during that period,
he, nevertheless, contends that he is entitled to
admission as a citizen because Subdivision 5 of
Section 1101(f) of Title 8, U.S.C.A., Sec. 101(f)
(5), Immigration and Nationality Act, is unconstitutional in that (1) it does not provide a ‘uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ and (2) it is in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. . . .
[I] conclude that subdivision 5 of Section 1101
(f), being uniformly of geographical applicability, is not unconstitutional, even though a person
who lives in Gardena, California, where gambling is permitted, might be entitled to be naturalized, whereas the same acts committed in Los
Angeles might result in lawful arrest and denial
of citizenship. . . .
The petition for naturalization of Lee Wee will be
denied on the ground that petitioner has failed to
establish good moral character during the period
required by law in that he has in fact been convicted of more than two gambling offenses
during the requisite ﬁve year period.95
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In Petition of Reginelli,91 the New Jersey Supreme
Court, disagreeing with the trial court, also held that
the petitioner lacked good moral conduct because of
his gambling:
It was established in a prior application and so
found by the federal District Court in 1949 that
Reginelli’s only source of income then was from
gambling. His prior criminal activities and record,
plus his unsatisfactory explanation of his present
sources of income, under these circumstances,
compel the conclusion that his large, otherwise
unexplained income during the period into which
we are inquiring was still derived from the same
illegal gambling activities.
His attempted explanation of the sources of his
income, i.e., that he earned it from wagering on
race horses, was incredible, especially in view of
his inability to recall the name of a single horse
on which he had won a large sum of money
during the preceding ﬁve years, although he at
times bet thousands of dollars. . . .
Our conclusions are in accord with those
reached by the examiner, and we ﬁnd that the

90

Id. at 164–65.

91

119 A.2d 454 (N.J.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918 (1956).

92

Id. at 457–58.

93

143 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Cal. 1956).

94

Id. at 737.

95

Id. at 737–38. For a further discussion, see, e.g., Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696 (1999).

VI. DENATURALIZATION
It is extremely rare for a person who has gained U.S.
citizenship to have it revoked.96 However, if the person procured his or her citizenship through fraud, the
96
In 2020, however, the Trump administration announced plans to make revocations more common. See Katie Benner, Ofﬁce of Denaturalization Is Established,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2020, at A15 (“The Justice Department said Wednesday that it
had created an ofﬁcial section in its immigration ofﬁce to strip citizenship rights
from naturalized immigrants, a move that gives more heft to the Trump administration’s broad efforts to remove from the country immigrants who have committed crimes.”).
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government can seek revocation.97 In United States
v. Costello,98 for example, the Second Circuit ordered Maﬁa boss Frank Costello’s citizenship revoked because his 1925 naturalization application
had concealed his extensive criminal dealings,
which included “engag[ing] in large-scale gambling
operations[.]”99 On appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the case dismissed because
the government had failed to ﬁle an afﬁdavit of
good cause.100

whether the respondent is a person of good moral
character. . . . The respondent, in fact, testiﬁed
that for most of his life he has derived his income
principally from betting on horse races. . . .
According to the record his last proﬁtable employment as the owner of a business was in
1922–1923 when he operated a restaurant. . . .
We ﬁnd no error on the part of the special inquiry
ofﬁcer in considering the respondent’s illegal
gambling activities as a factor in reaching a
conclusion that relief is not warranted on this
record.104

Downloaded by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers from www.liebertpub.com at 03/22/21. For personal use only.

VII. THE ROLE OF DISCRETION
In deciding the cases that come before them, immigration ofﬁcials have substantial discretion.101 Gambling crimes can push them towards, or away from,
showing leniency.102

Similarly, in Matter of N-M-B-M-,105 the respondent’s request for cancellation was denied.106
Although the AAO primarily based its decision on
the respondent’s failure to demonstrate extreme hardship,107 it also noted:
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In Matter of De Lucia,103 the BIA wrote:

As the Director found, in 2007, the Applicant
was convicted of aggravated bodily injury in the
third degree in violation of New Jersey Statutes
Annotated § 2C:12-1b(1) and was sentenced to
two years of probation. In addition, in 2008,
he was convicted of promoting gambling in
violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated §
2C:37-2A(2) and sentenced to two years of
probation. The record further shows the Applicant was again convicted of promoting
gambling in 2012, sentenced to three years of
probation, and ordered to perform 100 hours of
community service.

Counsel urges that the respondent’s illegal
gambling activities in 1962 furnishes no basis for
the special inquiry ofﬁcer’s conclusion that the
respondent is not a person of good moral character. While it is true that section 249 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended,
does not require an applicant for relief to establish good moral character for any speciﬁed
period of time, nevertheless, we believe that an
illegal $10,000 bet on the World Series and an
illegal $15,000 wager on a prize ﬁght in 1962 are
factors properly considered by the special inquiry ofﬁcer in reaching a conclusion as to
97

The record further reﬂects that the applicant has been arrested and convicted
18 times for illegal gambling between 1978 and 1991. Although his gambling convictions are not crimes involving moral turpitude, they are violations of local laws, which when considered in their totality over a 13 year
period, show the applicant’s inability to abide by those laws. Such inability to
abide by speciﬁc laws does not support a showing of rehabilitation or that his
admission would not be contrary to the welfare, safety, or security of the
United States.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1451.

98

247 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1957), rev’d, 356 U.S. 256 (1958).

99

Id. at 385.

100

See Costello, 356 U.S. at 257. Although the government reﬁled, its new case also
was thrown out. See Costello v. I.N.S., 376 U.S. 120 (1964). For a further look at
Costello’s life, see GEORGE WOLF & JOSEPH DIMONA, FRANK COSTELLO: PRIME
MINISTER OF THE UNDERWORLD (1974).
101
In Matter of I-D-R-, 2017 WL 3837307 (A.A.O. 2017), for example, a noncitizen was found to be deportable. On appeal, however, he was permitted to remain
because his removal was likely to upend his wife’s recent recovery from a gambling
addiction.
102
Of course, there are some cases in which discretion cannot be exercised. See,
e.g., Tahir v. Lehmann, 171 F. Supp. 589, 590 (N.D. Ohio 1958) (“At subsequent
hearings, it appeared that petitioner had, during the period of 10 years last past, been
convicted on six occasions of gambling offenses and on that account was unable to
establish good moral character. . . . ”), aff’d mem., 264 F.2d 892 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 876 (1959); Matter of A-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 242 (B.I.A. 1954)
(refusing to stop respondent’s deportation because he had been arrested seven
times, including at least twice for gambling offenses). In In re Applicant, 1995 WL
18235771 (O.A.A. 1995), the applicant’s request to be admitted to the United States
was turned down in part because:

Id. at *2.
See also Liu v. Ashcroft, 78 F. App’x 609, 609 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Feng’s evasive
responses at the deportation hearing to questions about her knowledge of the illegal
gambling scheme to which she had pled guilty supported the IJ’s ‘decision to give
[her] testimony ‘very little weight[.]’ See Sarvia–Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387,
1393 (9th Cir.1985).”).
103
11 I. & N. Dec. 565 (B.I.A. 1966), aff’d, 370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
104

Id. at 574.
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2018 WL 5298705 (A.A.O. 2018).

106

Id. at *3.

107

Id.
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We note that the Applicant and his spouse deny
that he committed the actions which led to his
conviction for aggravated bodily injury. In addition, he mentioned only this conviction in his
waiver application, asserting that he had no other
criminal record. However, as noted above, the
Applicant was also convicted in 2008 and 2012
for promoting gambling. His failure to take responsibility for his actions and entire criminal
record would weigh heavily against the favorable exercise of discretion.108

trouble with the law since 2000, testiﬁed that he
recognized that he had a gambling problem and
no longer goes to the gambling clubs. . . . 112
In the absence of actual proof, the failure of ofﬁcials
to show leniency in a gambling case is likely to be
countermanded.113 In Rassano v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,114 the government sought
to deport the petitioner because of his alleged involvement in gambling and prostitution. The Seventh Circuit, however, found the government’s
suspicions insufﬁcient:

In In re Anastasiadis,109 the respondent was ruled
deportable after completing a 38-month sentence
for federal racketeering.110 He also had two gambling convictions.111 Nevertheless, the BIA cancelled his removal after ﬁnding that he had
changed his ways:

In its concluding presentation to us on this
appeal the Service notes that petitioner has had
no difﬁculty with the law in recent years, yet
urges that highly credible evidence links him to
gambling and prostitution through his employment and investments. It then immediately
follows with the Board’s statement that petitioner “is also an acknowledged close associate
of Joseph Aiuppa, whose leading position in
gambling, prostitution and other forms of vice
in the Cicero[, Illinois] area is well established
in this record.”
We have no brief for Mr. Aiuppa nor do we hold
up petitioner as a model of exemplary conduct.
However, it has become crystal clear to us that
the thread which holds this fabric together is
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The existence of a criminal record and its nature,
recency, and seriousness bear directly on the
respondent’s undesirability as a permanent resident of the United States. . . . The respondent’s
racketeering conviction for co-owning a gambling business is now 17 years old. He admitted
pleading guilty to two other gambling-related
offenses, but the record does not reﬂect that these
offenses were serious in nature. . . . Furthermore, the respondent, who has not been in

108
Id. at *2–*3 nn.1–2. For another such case, see In re Self-Petitioner, 2014 WL
7793550, at *8 (A.A.O. 2014) (“The petitioner’s concealment of his arrests, and his
failure to discuss the circumstances surrounding his arrests and his conviction for a
gambling related offense, reﬂect negatively on his moral character.”).
109

addition, the Applicant did not submit, as requested, court documentation . . . indicating the disposition[] for the aforementioned arrest[].
Accordingly, the Applicant . . . is also ineligible [to remain in the country]
b. ecause of his failure to provide information necessary for the adjudication
of his application. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(14), 244.9(a).

2008 WL 5537745 (B.I.A. 2008).

110

Id. at *1.

111

Id.

112

Id. at *2.

113

But see Cho v. Ashcroft, 76 F. App’x 184, 184 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Cho moved to
continue removal proceedings until the outcome of his wife’s application for adjustment of status. The IJ denied the motion after considering the nature of the
requested relief, the likelihood of hardship to Cho’s family, and Cho’s alleged
involvement in illegal gambling. Based on this record the IJ did not clearly abuse its
discretion by denying Cho’s motion for a continuance.”).
It is, of course, incumbent on the applicant to produce all pertinent records, including copies of any gambling arrests or convictions:
We sent the Applicant a request for evidence (RFE), as a Federal Bureau of
Investigation report based upon his ﬁngerprints indicated that he was found
guilty at trial for misdemeanor minor gambling under section 463.350 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes in [] 2000. . . . We requested court documentation
indicating the disposition[] of the Applicant’s misdemeanor minor gambling . . . offense[].
In response, the Applicant submits the results of a criminal history check
from the [] Metropolitan Police Department. This police department record
does not contain any information regarding the . . . quer[y] in our RFE. In

Matter of F-L-R-, 2017 WL 2573408, at *4 (A.A.O. 2017). See also In re Applicant, 2009 WL 6701142 (A.A.O. 2009) (dismissing applicant’s appeal because
he did not supply information regarding, among others things, his 1991 and 1992
arrests for promoting gambling).
In In re Wan, 2003 WL 23269867 (B.I.A. 2003), the BIA decided that the respondent’s alleged concealment of his gambling conviction could be ignored because it would not change the case’s ultimate outcome:
We note that the DHS has attempted to submit evidence that the respondent
lied on the stand when he testiﬁed that he had not been convicted of any
crimes in the last year. . . . The DHS suggests that the respondent was, in
fact, convicted of Attempted Promoting of Gambling in the Second Degree a
number of months before giving such testimony. . . . In most cases, our
practice would be to deem the DHS’s appeal to be a motion to remand to
permit the Immigration Judge to consider the new evidence. . . . Because we
sustain the DHS’s appeal on other grounds, we need not grant the motion.
Id. at *2 n.2.
In Plewa v. I.N.S., 77 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 1999), the applicant failed to disclose
in her naturalization application that she once had been arrested for gambling. The
court excused the omission after ﬁnding that the applicant had been told by an experienced immigration counselor “that the incident need not be disclosed.” Id. at 912.
114

492 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1974).
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inextricably comprised of ﬁbers of hearsay and
guilt by association. Such reeds are too slender
for this cloth.115

claimed to have won from gambling, is the
amount indicated as other income on the original
2004 federal tax return under Exhibit 2a, Tab B,
and on the amended tax return submitted on
appeal. Therefore, we do not ﬁnd that the record
sufﬁciently supports the Immigration Judge’s
ﬁnding that the respondent’s testimony concerning his 2004 income and tax returns was not
credible. Further, we do not ﬁnd that the record
supports a ﬁnding that the respondent has a
gambling problem.117

Downloaded by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers from www.liebertpub.com at 03/22/21. For personal use only.

In In re Ghulam,116 the BIA decided that the immigration judge had erred by ordering the respondent
deported for, among other reasons, his alleged gambling problem:
Third, we ﬁnd that the respondent has sufﬁciently explained why his wife’s testimony
suggests that she was unaware that a large portion of his income in 2004 was from gambling
winnings (compare Tr. at 24 with 43). As the
respondent indicated in his appellate brief, he
testiﬁed that his wife did not initially know about
his gambling (Tr. at 32). In addition, we note that
$24,500, which is the amount the respondent

115

VIII. CONCLUSION
At times, the U.S. immigration system can resemble
a giant casino.118 And as this article has shown, a
lawyer who does not know its rules can do serious
harm to his or her client.119
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Id. at 226–27. In United States v. Sanchez-Espinoza, 343 F. App’x 254 (9th Cir.
2009), the Ninth Circuit, in a case with very different factual circumstances, also
rejected the government’s speculation:
[T]he district court plainly erred in ﬁnding that Sanchez smuggled at least
one hundred aliens based on four smuggling incidents over ﬁve years and
Sanchez’s immense gambling losses. Such conjecture is insufﬁcient to
support application of a sentencing enhancement. See United States v.
Eirven, 987 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir.1993). Rather, the district court was
limited to an enhancement consistent with the evidence presented at trial, i.e.,
at least ﬁfty-four aliens.
Id. at 257.

116

2007 WL 275781 (B.I.A. 2007).

117

Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).

118

See generally Dejan Gavrilovic, What Immigration and Gambling Have in
Common and What It Has to Do with All of Us[], LCB (Mar. 11, 2019), https://lcb.
org/news/editorials/what-immigration-and-gambling-have-in-common-and-whatit-has-to-do-with-all-of-us. In touting the annual Diversity Visa Lottery (8 U.S.C. §
1153(c)), one website exclaims:
Every year the United States gives away 55,000 US permanent resident cards
(Green Cards) to winners of the Diversity Visa Lottery also known as Green
Card Lottery. And the best part is: Almost everyone can participate!
Apply now for the ofﬁcial US Green Card Lottery or check your result of the
previous lottery—are you a winner?

Green Card Lottery, THE AMERICAN DREAM, https://www.green-card.com/greencard-lottery/. For a further look at the diversity lottery, which is designed to admit persons from countries with low immigration rates to the United States, see
Patrick Kennedy, The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 159 (2018).
The United States also annually holds a lottery for 65,000 H-1B visas, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(g)(1)(A), which allows recipients to temporarily work in the country. See

Emily C. Callan, Is the Game Still Worth the Candle (or the Visa)? How the H-1B
Visa Lottery Lawsuit Illustrates the Need for Immigration Reform, 80 ALB. L. REV.
335, 335 (2016–2017) (describing the H1-B lottery as “arguably the worst game
ever invented by our government in the history of our country.”). For a case in
which a casino’s cardroom manager was deemed ineligible for an H-1B visa because his position did not require any special skills, see In re Petitioner, 1996 WL
33420392 (O.A.A. 1996). For a case reaching the opposite conclusion with respect
to a casino’s cardroom supervisor, see In re Petitioner, 1995 WL 1797683 (O.A.A.
1995).
The refugee asylum claims process also has been likened to gambling. See, e.g.,
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Angela DeVolld, Note, Refugee Roulette: Wagering
on Morality, Sexuality, and Normalcy in U.S. Asylum Law, 92 NEB. L. REV. 627
(2014).
119

Except, of course, in Hollywood, where there always is a happy ending. In the
1951 movie Gambling House (RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.), U.S. immigration ofﬁcials begin deportation proceedings against gambler Marc Fury (Victor Mature)
after he beats a murder rap. In exchange for $50,000, Fury had stood trial for
gangster Joe Farrow (William Bendix), who, during a crooked craps game, had
killed one of the other players and wounded Fury to ensure Fury’s cooperation.
After Fury is acquitted, Farrow reneges on the deal, but Fury eventually manages to
get Farrow to pay up. By now, however, Fury has learned from Lynn Warren (Terry
Moore), a social worker he has become interested in romantically, that an immigrant family named the Sobieskis are about to be deported because they have lost
their sponsor. Fury therefore gives the $50,000 to Warren so that the Sobieskis can
stay in the country. Fury then delivers an impassioned speech at his own hearing
explaining why he wants to remain in the United States, which causes Judge
Ravinek (Basil Ruysdael) to cancel Fury’s deportation order. See Gambling House
(1951), TCM, http://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/75929/Gambling-House/. See also
Paul Magro, Media Portrayal—Movies, in 2 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE 384, 387 (James Ciment &
John Radzilowski eds. 2d ed. 2015) (commending Gambling House for shining a
light on “the struggles of European refugees.”).
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